← All Posts
SecuritynpmSupply Chain

PolinRider Ethereum Loader Found in 10 Hijacked npm Packages

November 17, 2026

Yes, the North Korea-linked PolinRider campaign has resurfaced on npm. Sonatype Research Labs found hidden loaders in 12 releases across 10 hijacked packages, published on November 3, 2026. Each loader asks an Ethereum wallet's latest transaction where to download its next stage, so the attacker can change servers without touching the packages again.

The part that catches people out: none of these releases use an install script. The code runs when your app loads the package, so turning off install scripts does not help.

Key Takeaways

  • 12 malicious releases across 10 npm packages, tracked by Sonatype as sonatype-2026-010515. OX Security lists seven more packages with the same loader family.
  • No install or postinstall hook. The loader runs when an affected entrypoint is loaded, or when the bundled app starts.
  • A hard-coded Ethereum wallet acts as a dead drop: the first bytes of a transaction's recipient address encode the payload server's IP.
  • A lockfile hit does not prove the code ran, and an import error does not prove it didn't. If it ran, treat the host as compromised and rotate credentials.
  • Linking this to PolinRider rests on a matching wallet, overlapping infrastructure and identical retrieval paths. Sonatype stops short of proving a shared operator with GhostAction.

What happened in the PolinRider npm attack?

Attackers published runtime loaders in 12 releases of 10 npm packages, some of which had gone years without an update. Sonatype links the activity to PolinRider, a campaign it describes as known for hiding loaders in compromised GitHub repositories and now more prominent on npm. Socket, which tracks PolinRider as an ongoing campaign, ties it to the Contagious Interview / Famous Chollima cluster and counts 162 malicious artifacts across 108 packages and extensions on npm, Packagist, Go modules and Chrome as of its July reporting. Sonatype also caught a hijacked package nearly delivering a PolinRider-linked RAT back in May.

The affected packages do unrelated jobs, from Redux integration to health APIs to browser activity tracking. What they share is hidden behavior tucked into otherwise ordinary code. If you followed our coverage of the Mastra npm attack, this is the same lesson again: a trusted package name is not a safety signal.

Which npm packages are affected?

Sonatype confirmed these releases:

  • @adminide-stack/client-redux 0.0.16-18
  • @adminide-stack/health-api-server 0.0.18-alpha.465
  • @adminide-stack/user-activity-browser 1.1.3-alpha.114
  • @adminide-stack/utils 0.0.16-129 and 0.0.16-130
  • @adminide-stack/forms-core 5.1.9-alpha.3
  • @adminide-stack/yantra-help-browser 12.0.194
  • @cdmbase/wiki-browser 12.0.18-alpha.53
  • @pubngo-stack/help-browser 12.0.23-alpha.3
  • server-hemera-mongo 0.0.15 and 0.0.16
  • cdeops 13.5.31

OX Security's write-up of the same campaign adds seven more: react-contact-forms 0.5.2, tailwindcss-form-utils 0.5.9, tailwind-contact-forms 0.5.8, tailwindcss-contact-form 0.5.5, tailwind-form-core 0.5.5, tailwind-input-kit 0.5.5 and tailwind-forms-kit 0.5.5. OX marks every package in its table as taken down and puts the combined weekly downloads at roughly 1,400. That is small, but small packages sit deep in dependency trees, so check transitive dependencies too.

How does the Ethereum dead-drop loader work?

The loader uses a public blockchain as a lookup table for its command-and-control address. Per Sonatype's decoding of all 12 releases, it works like this:

  1. It queries public Ethereum RPC endpoints, with a Blockscout API fallback, for a transaction sent by a hard-coded wallet.
  2. It reads the first four bytes of the transaction's recipient address as a primary IPv4 address, and the next four as a secondary one.
  3. It fetches XOR-encoded JavaScript from the primary address over plain HTTP on TCP port 443, using the paths /0x/cls and /0x/ls.
  4. It XOR-decodes the responses. The /0x/cls payload goes to eval inside the app process and to a detached node -i process via piped stdin. The /0x/ls payload goes only to the detached process, which is left unreferenced so it keeps running on its own.

The wallet is the clever bit. To move the payload server, the operator just sends another transaction. The published packages never change, and blocking one IP does not stop the loader from finding the next. The wallet Sonatype recovered is 0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3.

There are two disguises. Six releases hide the loader in an eval(atob(...)) Base64 wrapper. The other six use a character-permutation bootstrap that rebuilds the code and runs it through the JavaScript Function constructor. The decoded loaders in the second group are byte-identical, and both groups share the same wallet, paths and XOR keys. OX Security describes the same fileless, in-memory pattern via node -i. What the second-stage payload actually does varies by what the operator serves, and the sources I read don't describe a payload for these specific releases.

Why doesn't disabling install scripts protect you?

Sonatype's check of the manifests found no consumer install or postinstall hooks. The injected code sits in a file the package already runs: cdeops has it in client.js, ahead of the normal delegation to global.require('cdeops/client'), and server-hemera-mongo has it in dist/main.js, the bundle its start script runs. That means defaults like the ones in npm v12's blocked install scripts or --ignore-scripts won't stop it. The question that matters is whether the package code ran in a dev machine, CI worker, build host or deployed service.

How do I check if I'm affected?

Start with a name match across your lockfiles, then compare any hits against the versions above. This is my own quick starting point, not a Sonatype tool, and it matches names only:

grep -rEn "@adminide-stack/|@cdmbase/wiki-browser|@pubngo-stack/help-browser|server-hemera-mongo|cdeops" package-lock.json yarn.lock pnpm-lock.yaml

Then work through Sonatype's guidance:

  1. Check direct and transitive dependencies, lockfiles, internal npm mirrors, caches and build records for the affected versions, and stop your mirrors from serving them.
  2. Work out whether the injected file actually executed, using build commands, process telemetry and runtime logs. A lockfile entry doesn't prove it ran, and an import error doesn't prove it didn't, because the import can fail after the injected code has already executed.
  3. If it ran, treat the host as compromised. Look for detached node -i processes launched by another Node process with piped stdin, and plain HTTP requests to TCP port 443 using /0x/cls or /0x/ls.
  4. Check request headers if you have them. Payload requests carry a Sec-V header with A10-npm_inject in the six Base64-wrapped releases, A10-II in @adminide-stack/utils 0.0.16-130, and A10-E in cdeops 13.5.31.
  5. Identify what the affected process could reach and rotate it: publishing credentials, repository access, cloud keys and CI secrets.

Network indicators: Sonatype's write-up cites Greenflagged's analysis, which reported 95.135.181.151 as the C2 address advertised on November 3. OX Security lists four addresses: 103[.]179[.]143[.]219, 166[.]88[.]134[.]75, 23[.]27[.]13[.]72 and 95[.]135[.]181[.]151. Because the operator can swap addresses, treat the behavioral indicators above as more durable than any IP.

How solid is the link to North Korea and GhostAction?

Reasonably solid for PolinRider, with a caveat on GhostAction. Sonatype matched the exact wallet to one GitGuardian reported on October 27 as the Ethereum resolver in PolinRider loaders found in compromised GitHub repositories. Those loaders used the same /0x/cls and /0x/ls paths and port, and one of the same IPs appears as a fallback C2 in a PolinRider persistence script. Sonatype's video attributes PolinRider to the Lazarus Group, while noting that "Lazarus" is also used loosely for related North Korean activity. The same GitGuardian report is about how GhostAction crossed paths with PolinRider, and Sonatype is explicit that its evidence does not prove the two share an operator. For the GitHub Actions side of that story, see our piece on GhostAction's fake security audit workflows.

Wrapping Up

This attack skips the install hook and keeps its infrastructure on a blockchain, so the usual hardening steps only partly apply. Today, grep your lockfiles for the packages above, then confirm whether the code ever ran; if it did, rotate everything that host could touch.

Sources

Frequently Asked Questions

What is PolinRider?

PolinRider is a North Korea-linked supply chain campaign that Socket ties to the Contagious Interview / Famous Chollima cluster. It plants obfuscated JavaScript loaders in repositories, package releases and extensions, and Socket tracks it across npm, Packagist, Go modules and Chrome extensions.

How does the PolinRider Ethereum loader work?

The loader reads the latest transaction from a hard-coded Ethereum wallet and decodes the first bytes of the recipient address into a payload-server IP. It then downloads XOR-encoded JavaScript from that server and executes it. The operator can change the server by sending a new transaction, without republishing any package.

Does --ignore-scripts protect me from PolinRider?

Not for these releases. Sonatype found no install or postinstall hooks. The loader runs when the package's code is loaded or when the bundled app starts, so disabling install scripts doesn't prevent it.

Which npm packages were hijacked in the November 2026 PolinRider attack?

Sonatype confirmed 12 releases across 10 packages, including several under @adminide-stack, plus @cdmbase/wiki-browser, @pubngo-stack/help-browser, server-hemera-mongo and cdeops. OX Security's list adds seven more packages, such as react-contact-forms and several tailwind-* form packages. Check the full version list in this article against your lockfiles.

What should I do if an affected PolinRider package ran in my environment?

Treat the host as compromised. Look for detached node -i processes and plain HTTP requests to port 443 using /0x/cls or /0x/ls, then rotate any credentials the process could reach, including publishing tokens, repository access, cloud keys and CI secrets.